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INTRODUCTION
In 1998, the International Criminal Court (ICC) became the
first international criminal tribunal ever officially to criminalize
forced pregnancy.1 Atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
were the impetus for promoting better protection of women in conflict
zones. With the passing of the Rome Statute, a range of gender-
related crimes were specifically enumerated as crimes against hu-
manity and war crimes, including rape, sexual slavery, trafficking,
forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and “any
other form of sexual violence.” 2 The criminalization of forced preg-
nancy was one piece of this effort to provide greater protection to
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 5(1), 7(1)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii),
8(2)(e)(v), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-9CDC7CF02886
/283503/RomeStatutEng1.pdf; see also Kristen Boon, Rape and Forced Pregnancy Under
the ICC Statute: Human Dignity, Autonomy, and Consent, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
625, 630 (2001) (heralding the Rome Statute as the first international instrument to cod-
ify forced pregnancy).
2. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 7(1)(g), 7(2)(c), 8(2)(b)(xxii).
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women.3 Following the conflict in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995, it
was alleged that the Serbs impregnated Croat and Muslim women
and forced them to bear Serb children as part of a systematic plan.4
Following Rwanda’s genocide in 1994, the National Population Office
estimated that “victims of rape gave birth to an estimated 2,000–
5,000 ‘children of hate.’ ” 5 It was with these cruelties in mind that
the Rome Statute was formed.6 The Statute, which creates sub-
stantially greater protection for women, represents a significant
departure from the general prohibition against sexual violence that
preceded its enactment.7
Although the inclusion of forced pregnancy as a crime under
international criminal law was seen as a positive step for the pro-
tection of women in conflict zones, the high level of intent that is re-
quired in order to demonstrate that forced pregnancy has occurred
seems to indicate that the crime will be difficult to prosecute success-
fully should a case eventually come before the ICC.8 Indeed, it may
be that the high level of intent needed to prove the crime is the rea-
son the crime of forced pregnancy has yet to be charged. Furthermore,
the multiple levels of intent seem to suggest that the crime of forced
pregnancy is targeted more at preventing the perpetration of ethnic
crimes than at preventing crimes aimed at violating women.9 This
is particularly evident when one compares the elements of forced
pregnancy under the Rome Statute against those for rape.10
3. See Joshua H. Joseph, Gender and International Law: How the International
Criminal Court Can Bring Justice to Victims of Sexual Violence, 18 TEX. J. WOMEN &
L. 61, 63 (2008) (“Nearly all of the gender-related provisions of the Statute are exclusive
to the ICC and/or represent a reformulation of previously non-codified law.”).
4. U.N. Secretary-General, Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), ¶ 248, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27,
1994) [hereinafter Report of the Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia]. Bosnia was
unable, however, to establish that there was a Serbian policy of forced pregnancy be-
fore the International Court of Justice. Application of Convention on Prevention and
Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment,
2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶¶ 362–67 (Feb. 26); see also infra Part II.C (describing the findings of
the Commission).
5. Robyn Charli Carpenter, Forced Maternity, Children’s Rights and the Genocide
Convention: A Theoretical Analysis, 2 J. GENOCIDE RES. 213, 223 (2000).
6. See id. at 241 n.2 (noting that “forced impregnation” was considered in the cre-
ation of the Rome Statute).
7. See Boon, supra note 1, at 630; see also infra Part II (explaining the evolution of
sexual crimes in international law).
8. See infra Part III (discussing the intent requirements for forced pregnancy as
genocide, as a crime against humanity and as a war crime).
9. See infra Part IV.A (describing how the forced pregnancy provision is seemingly
aimed more at preventing crimes against ethnic groups as a whole from being committed
than at protecting individual women).
10. See infra Part IV.B (comparing the ICC’s forced pregnancy and rape provisions).
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This Note will look closely at the intent elements for forced preg-
nancy under the ICC and then point out two central flaws: 1) the high
level of intent, which makes it difficult to prosecute the crime, and
2) that one of the elements that must be found to prosecute forced
pregnancy suggests that the aim of forced pregnancy under the
Rome Statute is less concerned with preventing crimes against
women than with preventing crimes against a certain ethnicity.
Part I of this Note will examine the Statute itself and its elements
as listed in the Elements of Crimes.11 Part II will provide a short
history of forced pregnancy and how it has evolved from an unenu-
merated crime under the broad category of “acts of sexual violence”
to a specific, individualized crime. Part III will discuss the intent
problems that have emerged as a result of the language of the Rome
Statute. Part IV will compare the Rome Statute’s forced pregnancy
prohibition against its rape provision to demonstrate that the way
forced pregnancy is defined under the ICC Charter is aimed more
towards protecting ethnic groups as a whole than protecting indi-
vidual women from sexual violence. Finally, Part V will suggest a few
ways that the forced pregnancy provision might be revised to make
it both more likely to be prosecuted successfully, and to have a bet-
ter likelihood of protecting the women it was designed to protect.
Making the proposed changes to the provision would finally fulfill
the goal of the attendees of the Rome Conference—to help protect
women from violence in conflict zones.
I. THE STATUTE AND THE ELEMENTS OF FORCED PREGNANCY
A. The Statute
Forced pregnancy under the Rome Statute is defined as “the
unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the
intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carry-
ing out other grave violations of international law.”12 It further adds
11. Addendum Part II, Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, Preparatory
Comm’n for the Int’l Crim. Court, Mar. 3–13, June 12–30, 2000, arts. 7(1)(g)-4, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-4,
8(2)(e)(vi)-4, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000) [hereinafter Elements].
12. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(f ). This note focuses primarily with the added
intent of “affecting the ethnic composition of any population,” largely setting aside the sec-
ond option for additional intent: “carrying out other grave violations of international law.”
This choice is based largely on the fact that the ICC does not explain or define what it means
by “grave violations.” See Milan Markovic, Vessels of Reproduction: Forced Pregnancy and
the ICC, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 439, 443 & n.32 (2007). Undoubtedly, this second option
for additional intent broadens the scope of which instances of forced pregnancy could be
brought under the forced pregnancy provision, but it remains unclear what “grave
violations” would qualify.
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that the definition “shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting
national laws relating to pregnancy.”13
Forced pregnancy falls under at least two of the three categories
of crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC: crimes against
humanity and war crimes.14 According to some scholars, forced preg-
nancy could qualify as genocide under the Rome Statute as well.15
B. The Elements
The Rome Statute’s Elements of Crimes for forced pregnancy sets
out precisely what must be proven for a defendant to be prosecuted
successfully under the Statute.16 The elements for establishing forced
pregnancy as a crime against humanity differ only slightly from those
constituting a war crime.
For forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity, three ele-
ments must be met:
1. The perpetrator confined one or more women forcibly made
pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any
population or carrying out other grave violations of international
law[;] 2. [t]he conduct was committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against a civilian population[; and] 3.
[t]he perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended
the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack direct-
ed against a civilian population.17
Likewise, three elements must also be proven to prosecute forced
pregnancy as a war crime successfully:
1. The perpetrator confined one or more women forcibly made
pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of
13. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(f ). This addition was an effort to appease gov-
ernment leaders, the Catholic Church, and NGOs who were concerned that the provision
would legalize abortion and that it could be used to circumvent anti-abortion laws. See infra
note 81 and accompanying text. The language about not affecting national laws demon-
strated that the ICC did not recognize a general right to abortion. Markovic, supra note
12, at 445–48 (discussing at length the problems involved in including the abortion
language); see also Cate Steains, Gender Issues, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 357, 366–67 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (describing how
Catholic and Arab delegates were concerned that the provision on forced pregnancy could
be used to coerce states into allowing abortions).
14. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 7(1)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi).
15. For arguments on why forced pregnancy is an act of genocide, see Boon, supra
note 1, passim and Siobhan K. Fisher, Note, Occupation of the Womb: Forced Impregnation
as Genocide, 46 DUKE L.J. 91 passim (1996). But see Markovic, supra note 12, at 454–56
(discussing the problems with including forced pregnancy as genocide).
16. Elements, supra note 11, arts. 7(1)(g)-4, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-4, 8(2)(e)(vi)-4.
17. Id. art. 7(1)(g)-4.
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any population or carrying out other grave violations of interna-
tional law[;] 2. [t]he conduct took place in the context of and was
associated with an international armed conflict[; and] 3. [t]he
perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established
the existence of an armed conflict.18
The first element of the crime, whether the charge is for a war
crime or a crime against humanity, is simply the definition of forced
pregnancy,19 whereas the other two elements are the requirements
for the offense to fall under the category of either crimes against
humanity or war crimes.20
II. HISTORY OF FORCED PREGNANCY
A. Before the World Wars
Although the Rome Statute marked the first time that forced
pregnancy was criminalized under international law, scholars often
presumed that forced pregnancy could be grouped together with other
acts of sexual violence and that crimes of forced pregnancy could have
been prosecuted as a member of that category. As early as 1646, acts
of sexual violence were condemned as being offenses against the Law
of Nations.21 Grotius wrote that acts that violate women should “be no
more unpunished in peace than in war: and this latter rule is the Law
of Nations.” 22 Furthermore, in 1863, sexual violence against women
was prohibited in the Lieber Code.23 Article 37 of the Lieber Code
states that the United States “acknowledge[s] and protect[s] . . . the
persons of the inhabitants, especially those of women: and the sa-
credness of domestic relations.” 24 Additionally, Article 44 specifically
18. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxii)-4. The second element varies depending on which section of the
Rome Statute is being charged. A defendant can be charged under Article 8(2)(b)(xxii)-4
if the conduct took place during an international conflict, id., whereas a defendant can be
charged under Article 8(2)(e)(vi)-4 if “[t]he conduct took place in the context of and was
associated with an armed conflict not of an international character.” Id. art. 8(2)(e)(vi)-4.
19. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(f ).
20. See id. arts. 7(1), 8(1). A crime against humanity is defined as “any of the following
acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population.” Id. art. 7(1). Additionally, the ICC has jurisdiction over war crimes
“when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such
crimes.” Id. art. 8(1).
21. CHRISTINE BYRON, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 144 (2009).
22. Id. (quoting H. GROTIUS, ON THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: AN ABRIDGED
TRANSLATION 330 (William Whewell trans., 1853)).
23. General Orders No. 100: The Lieber Code, AVALON PROJECT, arts. 37, 44, http://
avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
24. Id. art. 37.
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recognizes rape as a crime, one severe enough to be punishable by the
death penalty.25
The recognition of acts of sexual violence as specific offenses un-
der international law altered with the passing of the 1899 and 1907
Hague Regulations, which did not expressly prohibit sexual offenses
like the Lieber Code.26 Such offenses could, however, potentially fall
under Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, which stated that “[f ]amily
honor and rights . . . must be respected.” 27 Without a direct prohibition
against acts of sexual violence against women in times of war, sexual
violence occurred during both world wars, but in particular during
the Second World War.28 Neither the Tokyo tribunal nor its counter-
part in Nuremberg, both set up to prosecute war crimes of the Second
World War, recognized the crime of sexual violence in their charters.29
Without a documented prohibition against acts of violence, and de-
spite their prominence during World War II, the word rape—the most
prominent kind of sexual violence—did not even appear in the judg-
ment of the Tribunal at Nuremberg.30
B. Post–World War II
Following the Second World War, and perhaps in response to
the widespread sexual violence during the War,31 the 1949 Geneva
Conference prohibited crimes of sexual violence against women in two
articles.32 Article 14 of the Third Geneva Convention vaguely sets out
a prohibition against acts of sexual violence, stating that prisoners
25. Id. art. 44.
26. BYRON, supra note 21, at 144.
27. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Convention
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 46, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277,
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague04.asp; Convention with Respect
to the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 46, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, available
at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague02.asp.
28. BYRON, supra note 21, at 144.
29. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6 , Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S.
279; DEP’T OF STATE, TRIAL OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS 39–44 (1946) (containing the
complete charter of the Tokyo tribunal).
30. BYRON, supra note 21, at 144.
31. See id. at 144–45 (describing the widespread violence during World War II). Indeed,
the 1949 Geneva Convention was adopted because the earlier Geneva Conventions were
considered inadequate. Kelly D. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-
Related Crimes Under International Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles,
21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 288, 303 (2003).
32. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949
art. 14, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12,
1949 art. 27, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
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of war are entitled to “respect for their persons and their honour” 33
and that “[w]omen shall be treated with all the regard due to their
sex.” 34 A bigger problem, however, was that the elements of the of-
fenses were not developed by the Convention: “it [was] left to the
commentary . . . to spell out that ‘the main intention [of the pro-
vision was] to defend women prisoners against rape, forced prosti-
tution and any form of indecent assault.’ ” 35
Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention put forth a more
explicit prohibition against violence directed at women.36 It states
that “[w]omen shall be especially protected against any attack on their
honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form
of indecent assault.”37 The violation was, however, still presented as an
attack against a person’s honor rather than an attack on their phys-
ical integrity.38 Article 27 included that all people had the right “to
respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their re-
ligious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs.” 39
One scholar noted that framing sexual violence as a crime against
honor or modesty is “an inadequate description of the suffering caused
by the offence.” 40 Another adds that it is problematic to consider rape
“as a mere injury to honor or reputation appear[ing] less worthy of
prosecution than injuries to the person.” 41
The 1977 Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions
took several more steps towards protecting women from acts of sexual
violence.42 Foremost, Article 75(2)(b) of Protocol I expressly prohib-
its enforced prostitution and “any form of indecent assault,” at any
time or place.43 Article 76 reiterated the Article 75 provision by ex-
pressly prohibiting rape, stating that “[w]omen shall be the object
of special respect and shall be protected in particular against rape,
33. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 32, art. 14.
34. Id.
35. BYRON, supra note 21, at 145.
36. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 32, art. 27.
37. Id.
38. BYRON, supra note 21, at 145.
39. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 32, art. 27.
40. BYRON, supra note 21, at 145.
41. Catherine N. Niarchos, Women, War, and Rape: Challenges Facing the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 649, 674 (1995).
42. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 75(2)(b), 76(1), adopted
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 4(2)(e), adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
43. Additional Protocol I, supra note 42, art. 75(2)(b).
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forced prostitution and any other form of indecent assault.” 44 “[A]ny
form of indecent assault” was not defined, however, and its vagueness
permits the possibility that forced pregnancy and other crimes of
sexual violence could fall within its parameters.45
C. Reactions to Yugoslavia and Rwanda
Awareness of the act of forced pregnancy first came into the pub-
lic sphere as an offense separate from other acts of sexual violence
after the atrocities in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995 and Rwanda
in 1994, as the crime was discussed in the adjudication of those con-
flicts. Forced pregnancy, however, had yet to be criminalized.46 As
such, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) had a
difficult time finding that forced pregnancy had taken place.
For example, in Case Concerning Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), the Bosnians and Croats
alleged that rape was used as a means of affecting “the demographic
balance by impregnating Muslim women with the sperm of Serb
males.”47 Despite express evidence to the contrary, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) found that the Serb leaders did not have a
systematic policy of forced impregnation.48
In the judgment, the court referenced numerous incidents that
seem to indicate that the Serbs did, in fact, implement a policy of rap-
ing women with the goal of impregnating them.49 For example, one
woman raped by two Serb soldiers was told that “she would now give
birth to Serb babies.” 50 The judgment also looked to the findings in
the Final Report of the Commission of Experts regarding the conflict
44. Id. art. 76(1); see also  Additional Protocol II, supra note 42, art. 4(2)(e) (listing rape,
enforced prostitution and indecent assault as “[o]utrages upon personal dignity,” which
shall be prohibited under all circumstances).
45. BYRON, supra note 21, at 145.
46. Neither the ICTY Statute nor the ICTR Statute criminalized forced pregnancy.
Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(amended Sept. 29, 2008), available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute
/statute_sept08_en.pdf; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(amended Jan. 31, 20120), available at http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English/Legal
/Statute/2010.pdf.
47. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 362 (Feb. 26).
48. Id. ¶¶ 362–67. According to the court, the evidence did “not establish that there
was any form of policy of forced pregnancy.” Id. ¶ 367.
49. Id. ¶¶ 363–65.
50. Id. ¶ 363 (quoting Prosecutor v. Gagovic, Case No. IT-96-23, Initial Indictment,¶ 9.3
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 26, 1996)).
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in Yugoslavia.51 The Final Report described five distinct patterns of
rape, one of which was for the purpose of forced pregnancy as later
defined by the Rome Statute.52 The Commission wrote:
The fourth pattern of rape involves individuals or groups com-
mitting sexual assaults against women for the purpose of terror-
izing and humiliating them often as part of the policy of “ethnic
cleansing.” Survivors of some camps report that they believe they
were detained for the purpose of rape. In those camps, all of the
women are raped quite frequently . . . . Some captors also state
that they are trying to impregnate the women. Pregnant women
are detained until it is too late for them to obtain an abortion. One
woman was detained by her neighbour (who was a soldier) near
her village for six months. She was raped almost daily by three or
four soldiers. She was told that she would give birth to a chetnik
boy who would kill Muslims when he grew up. They repeatedly
said their President had ordered them to do this.53
The Commission concluded that one commonality amongst the re-
ported cases was that “[p]erpetrators tell female victims that they will
bear children of the perpetrator’s ethnicity, [and] that the perpetra-
tors were ordered to rape and sexually assault them.” 54 Additionally,
“[p]erpetrators tell victims that they must become pregnant and hold
them in custody until it is too late for the victims to get an abortion.”55
The Bosnia v. Serbia decision described part of the Review of the
Indictment for the Karadzic case, where the Trial Chamber stated
that “[s]ome camps were specially devoted to rape, with the aim of
forcing the birth of Serbian offspring, the women often being in-
terned until it was too late to undergo an abortion” 56 and that “the
aim of many rapes was enforced impregnation.” 57 The court also not-
ed that “[s]everal witnesses also said that the perpetrators of sexual
assault, often soldiers, had been given orders to that effect and that
the camp commanders and officers had been informed thereof and
51. Id. ¶ 363.
52. Report of the Commission of Experts for Yugoslavia, supra note 4, ¶¶ 245–49.
53. Id. ¶ 248.
54. Chairman and Rapporteur on the Gathering and Analysis of the Facts, Final
Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780 (1992)—Annex Summaries and Conclusion, ¶ 489(e), U.N. Doc.
S/1994/674/Annexes (Dec. 28, 1994) (by M. Cherif Bassiouni), available at http://www.law
.depaul.edu/centers_institutes/ihrli/downloads/Annex_Summaries_and_Conclusions.pdf.
55. Id. ¶ 489(h).
56. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide,
2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 364 (alternation in original) (quoting Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case No.
IT-95-5/18-I (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 11, 1996)).
57. Id.
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participated therein.” 58 Despite the evidence that forced pregnancy
took place in the conflict, the ICJ found that “the evidence placed be-
fore it by the Applicant does not establish that there was any form
of policy of forced pregnancy.” 59 It is plausible that the court was not
really focusing on the crime of forced pregnancy in this judgment;
indeed, the crime of forced pregnancy was analyzed solely as part of
the analysis for another charge—forcibly transferring children of
the protected group to another group.60
Forced pregnancy also emerged as an issue in the adjudications
of the ICTR. In Prosecutor v. Akayesu, the court noted as dicta that
certain measures intended to prevent births within the group could
be construed as genocide.61 The ICTR included “deliberate impreg-
nat[ion]” in this list of acts62 when it was committed against a member
of a patriarchal society where membership of a group is recognized
by paternal identity:
In patriarchal societies, where membership of a group is deter-
mined by the identity of the father, an example of a measure in-
tended to prevent births within a group is the case where, during
rape, a woman of the said group is deliberately impregnated by
a man of another group, with the intent to have her give birth to
a child who will consequently not belong to its mother’s group.63
Following the atrocities in Bosnia, the United Nations began to
take note of the need to take substantial steps to protect women
from such violence. In 1993, the United Nations released the Vienna
Declaration, which required that “[g]ender-based violence . . . ,
including [acts] resulting from cultural prejudice . . . must be
eliminated.” 64 It noted that “legal measures” were one way to
achieve this goal.65 Later in the Declaration, violations of women’s
human rights during armed conflicts were specifically recognized as
“violations of the fundamental principles of international human
rights and humanitarian law.” 66 Additionally, forced pregnancy was
58. Karadzic, Case No. IT-95-5/18-I, at 960.
59. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide,
2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 367.
60. Id. ¶ 362.
61. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 507 (Sept. 2, 1998).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, pt. 1, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993) [hereinafter
Vienna Declaration].
65. Id.
66. Id. pt. 2, ¶ 38.
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singled out, along with murder, systematic rape, and sexual slavery,
as a violation needing a “particularly effective response.” 67
In 1995, in the wake of the Rwandan genocide, the Fourth World
Conference on Women in Beijing was held. It recognized the same
human rights as the Vienna Declaration and also specifically listed
forced pregnancy as a crime against women that violated human
rights in situations of armed conflict.68 Finally, in 1998, the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights made a resolution on the elim-
ination of violence against women.69 Like the Vienna Declaration and
Beijing Declaration, it specifically enumerated forced pregnancy as
a human rights violation, stating:
[The Commission] condemns all violations of the human rights
of women in situations of armed conflict, recognizes them to be
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law
and calls for a particularly effective response to violations of this
kind, including in particular murder, rape, including systematic
rape, sexual slavery and forced pregnancy.70
The resolution also called on governments “to refrain from engaging
in violence against women and to exercise due diligence to prevent,
investigate and . . . punish” these acts, regardless of whether the
perpetrator is the State or a private person.71
It is worth noting that the United Nations, in each of these
declarations/resolutions, continually framed forced pregnancy as an
act of violence targeted at women specifically—not as a crime against
an ethnic group.72 It is only with the debate during the meetings on
what to include in the Rome Statute that the emphasis on the wrong-
doing in situations of forced pregnancy shifted away from women and
towards ethnicity.73
67. Id.
68. Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, Sept. 4–15, 1995, Report of
the Fourth World Conference on Women, ¶ 114, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20 (Oct. 17, 1995)
[hereinafter Beijing Declaration].
69. Comm. on Human Rights Res. 1998/52, The Elimination of Violence Against
Women, 52d Sess., Supp. No. 3, E/CN.4/1998/52, at 171 (Apr. 17, 1998).
70. Id. ¶ 4.
71. Id. ¶ 3.
72. See id. ¶ 4; Beijing Declaration, supra note 68, ¶ 114; Vienna Declaration, supra
note 64, ¶ 38. All three of the resolutions/declarations included forced pregnancy as part
of their discussion regarding the need for greater protection for women.
73. The exception to this is the dicta in Akayesu, in which forced pregnancy was
framed as genocide—which by definition includes an intent to destroy a group based on
some characteristic of that group. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment,
¶ 507 (Sept. 2, 1998); see also Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 6 (defining genocide).
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D. The Emergence of the Rome Statute
The Statute for the International Criminal Court was the result
of a diplomatic conference.74 According to the preamble of the Statute,
the goal of the ICC is to “put an end to impunity for the perpetrators
of these [most serious crimes of concern to the international com-
munity] and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.” 75
In the series of meetings that took place in June and July of
1998 over the establishment of the ICC, the issue of how to frame the
crime of forced pregnancy emerged as a major “sticking point” for the
negotiations over the Rome Statute as a whole.76 Multiple views
emerged about how best to deal with the crime of forced pregnancy,
including whether it should be a crime at all.77 There was even dis-
agreement about the correct name for the crime.78 At different points
during the discussions, delegates referred to the act as both forced
pregnancy and enforced pregnancy.79 One delegate, Mr. Hamdan,
went so far as to suggest that “it might be better to refer to forcible
pregnancies the purpose of which was to change the identity of a
population group.” 80
74. History of the ICC, COALITION FOR INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.iccnow.org/?mod
=icchistory (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
75. Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl.
76. Summary Records of the 34th Meeting, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, Comm. of the Whole,
34th mtg., Agenda Item 11, ¶ 73, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.34 (1998) [hereinafter
34th Meeting Summary Record].
77. Multiple countries argued that it should not be a crime, largely because of their
concerns that it would trump national abortion laws. See infra notes 81–82 and
accompanying text.
78. Joseph, supra note 3, at 82 (noting the Catholic Church’s proposal to use the more
limiting “forcible impregnation” instead of “forced pregnancy”). Other states argued that
“forcible impregnation” would not encompass all the situations—like the one in Bosnia—
that the provision was supposed to protect women against. Id. at 83.
79. See, e.g., Summary Records of the 35th Meeting, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, Comm. of the Whole,
35th mtg., Agenda Item 11, ¶ 53, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.35 (1998) (stating that
the Liechtenstein delegation referred to the Act as forced pregnancy); Summary Records
of the 4th Meeting, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
of an Int’l Crim. Court, Comm. of the Whole, 4th mtg., Agenda Item 11, ¶ 63, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.4 (1998) [hereinafter 4th Meeting Summary Records] (noting that
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya delegation referred to the act as enforced pregnancy).
80. Summary Records of the 5th Meeting, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, Comm. of the Whole,
5th mtg., Agenda Item 11, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.5 (1998) [hereinafter 5th
Meeting Summary Records]. Hamdan’s suggested phrasing was his attempt to find a
solution to the concerns of many delegates that the inclusion of forced pregnancy would
allow abortions; his wording would not allow for abortions of women who were forcibly
made pregnant unless the intent was to affect a population’s ethnic identity. See id. The
definition of forced pregnancy ultimately included in the Rome Statute did end up in-
cluding the requirement of the intent to alter the ethnic makeup, which, as I will argue,
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There were two grounds upon which delegates argued that forced
pregnancy should not be included as a crime under the jurisdiction
of the ICC. The first was the issue of abortion. Numerous delegates
opposed the inclusion of forced pregnancy based on the concern that
it would allow women to abort pregnancies,81 an act that remains il-
legal in numerous countries around the world.82
Other delegates argued that forced pregnancy should simply be
encompassed under the prohibition against rape.83 The records from
the meetings summarize the view of Ms. Shahen from the Libyan del-
egation as follows: “[e]nforced pregnancy was the result of rape and
it was the act itself[, the act of rape,] that should constitute a crime.”84
Another delegate, Mr. Al Ansari from Kuwait, elaborated that “[t]he
term ‘enforced pregnancy’ . . . should be reconsidered because rape
was in any case criminalized and it might be considered that preg-
nancy was an aggravating circumstance of rape.” 85 Mr. Al Ansari
suggested that the issue regarding “threats to the identity of the ci-
vilian population should be considered in a different context.” 86
Ultimately, the delegates in favor of the inclusion of forced
pregnancy prevailed.87 Concessions to the countries concerned about
is the very element that makes it so difficult to prosecute successfully and shifts the focus
away from women to ethnic groups. See infra Part III (discussing the provision’s intent
problems) and Part IV (arguing that the provision focuses more on preventing crimes
against persons of a particular ethnicity than on protecting women from such violence).
81. See, e.g., Summary Records of the 3rd Meeting, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, Comm. of the Whole, 3d
mtg., Agenda Item 11, ¶ 32, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.3 (1998). Mr. Madani of Saudi
Arabia “opposed the reference to ‘enforced pregnancy’ . . . since his country was opposed
to abortion.” Id. Ms. Shahen of the Libyan delegation stated that “[u]nder Libyan leg-
islation, abortion, too, was a crime.” 4th Meeting Summary Records, supra note 79, ¶ 63.
Mr. Al Awadi of the United Arab Emirates “shared the Libyan delegation’s reservations
about the inclusion of enforced pregnancy.” Id. ¶ 66. Mr. Madani of Saudi Arabia re-
affirmed “his delegation’s view that references to enforced pregnancy should be deleted
because the law in his country did not allow abortions, except for health reasons es-
tablished by a doctor and in the event of danger to the mother.” 5th Meeting Summary
Records, supra note 80, ¶ 21.
82. See Summary of Abortion Laws Around the World, PREGNANT PAUSE (Apr. 15,
2002), http://www.pregnantpause.org/lex/world02.jsp.
83. See 5th Meeting Summary Records, supra note 80, ¶ 11; 4th Meeting Summary
Records, supra note 79, ¶ 63.
84. 4th Meeting Summary Records, supra note 79, ¶ 63.
85. 5th Meeting Summary Records, supra note 80, ¶ 11.
86. Id.
87. Mr. Sadi’s statements on behalf of the Jordan delegation were summarized as “he
understood that the sticking point in the negotiations concerned enforced pregnancy. In
his delegation’s view, abortion was not the issue; to force a woman to bear the child of a
rapist was torture in extreme form, and should be included as a crime against humanity.”
34th Meeting Summary Records, supra note 76, ¶ 73; see also Summary Records of the
36th Meeting, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an Int’l Crim. Court, Comm. of the Whole, 36th mtg., Agenda Item 11, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.36 (1998) (summarizing Delegate Tomic’s view that her delegation
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abortion were undoubtedly made, however, as indicated by the sec-
ond sentence in the adopted definition of forced pregnancy: “This
definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national
laws relating to pregnancy.” 88
Notably, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), following in
the ICC’s footsteps, chose to criminalize forced pregnancy as a crime
against humanity only.89 Article 2, dealing with crimes against hu-
manity, states: “[t]he Special Court shall have the power to prosecute
persons who committed the following crimes as part of a widespread
or systematic attack against any civilian population: . . . [r]ape, sex-
ual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other
form of sexual violence.” 90 There is, however, no clarifying language
that would help interpret the crime and it seems likely the SCSL
would follow the ICC’s definition of forced pregnancy and, as such,
inherit its difficulties regarding intent. To date, however, the crime of
forced pregnancy has not been charged at the SCSL or at the ICC.91
III. THE INTENT ELEMENT OF FORCED PREGNANCY
Each of the categories of international crimes under the Rome
Statute—genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes—have
their own intent problems with regard to forced pregnancy.92 It is
these intent problems that are the primary reason why it will be a
perhaps insurmountable task to prosecute forced pregnancy success-
fully as the Statute currently stands.
A. Forced Pregnancy as Genocide
Forced pregnancy as genocide is probably the least likely to be
prosecuted successfully under the Rome Statute since, as previously
mentioned, forced pregnancy is not specifically enumerated within
the Rome Statute as a crime of genocide.93 As such, for the crime of
forced pregnancy to be brought forth as a crime of genocide, it will
“firmly supported inclusion of crimes of sexual violence in their various manifestations, in-
cluding enforced pregnancies, both under war crimes and under crimes against humanity”).
Forced pregnancy was ultimately included as a specific offense under both war crimes and
crimes against humanity. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 7(1)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi).
88. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(f).
89. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 2, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S. 137.
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. Valerie Oosterveld, Gender-Based Crimes Against Humanity, in FORGING A
CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 78, 90 (Leila Nadya Sadat ed., 2011).
92. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 6, 7(1)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi).
93. See id. art. 6 (listing the five means by which a charge of genocide can be brought).
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have to fit within the parameters of one of the acts listed as genocide
under Article 6 of the Statute.94 Article 6 lists five acts that could be
considered genocide when “committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” 95 Scholars
have argued that forced pregnancy could potentially fall under two
of the five acts listed: (1) “[c]ausing serious bodily or mental harm
to members of the group” and (2) “[i]mposing measures intended to
prevent births.” 96
For genocide defined in Article 6(b) as “causing serious bodily
or mental harm,” four elements must be proven:
1. The perpetrator caused serious bodily or mental harm to one
or more persons[;] 2. [s]uch person or persons belonged to a par-
ticular national, ethnical, racial or religious group[;] 3. [t]he per-
petrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part, that national,
ethnical, racial or religious group as such[; and] 4. [t]he conduct
took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct
directed against that group or was conduct that could itself ef-
fect such destruction.97
Even though there is little argument that the acts of forced preg-
nancy could cause serious harm, both mental and physical, it would
be hard to prove that forced pregnancy could be used to destroy an
ethnic group.98 After all, if perpetrators really wanted to destroy a
particular ethnic group, there are much more effective methods than
impregnating the women of that group.99 As Milan Markovic notes,
“[p]resumably a group intent on genocide would not confine women
of the enemy group and let them go—they would kill them.”100
Additionally, there is some evidence that Croat and Muslim women
94. Id. (“For the purpose of this Statute, ‘genocide’ means any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or re-
ligious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children
of the group to another group.”).
95. Id.
96. Id.; see, e.g., Carmela Buehler, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and
Genocide: The Crime of Forced Pregnancy in the Nascent System of Supranational
Criminal Law, 18 NEMESIS 158, 165 (2002), available at http://www.iiav.nl/ezines/DivTs
/Nemesis/2002/nemesis_2002_crimes.pdf (discussing the psychological harm to victims
of forced pregnancy); Markovic, supra note 12, at 454 (stating that measures intended
to prevent births are genocide).
97. Elements, supra note 11, art. 6(b) (footnote omitted).
98. See Markovic, supra note 12, at 455–56.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 456.
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in Bosnia who were forced to bear Serbian offspring were treated
with extreme care,101 although one might expect that the women
were harmed psychologically simply by being impregnated by an
unwelcome man and then forced to bear his child.102
It will be especially difficult to demonstrate the intent element
of genocide outlined in Article 6(d). Article 6(d) requires that the
following elements be proven:
1. The perpetrator imposed certain measures upon one or more
persons[;] 2. [s]uch person or persons belonged to a particular na-
tional, ethnical, racial or religious group[;] 3. [t]he perpetrator in-
tended to destroy, in whole or part, that national, ethnical, racial
or religious group as such[;] 4. [t]he measures imposed were in-
tended to prevent births within that group [; and] 5. [t]he conduct
took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct
directed against that group or was conduct that could itself ef-
fect such destruction.103
Scholars have argued that by forcing women of one ethnicity to
bear children of a different ethnicity, the perpetrators are acting in
such a way as to prevent these women from bearing children of their
own ethnic group, and therefore it qualifies as a genocidal act be-
cause it represents a measure intended to prevent the birth of a
particular group.104 In other words, while impregnated with a child
of the “enemy” ethnic group, the woman is unable to give birth to
children of her own ethnicity.105
Since forced pregnancy results in the birth of children, however,
it is difficult to show that these actions are technically preventing
births.106 As one scholar questioned, “How is it possible to view the
creation of human life as genocidal?”107 In Akayesu, however, the
ICTR noted in dicta that forced pregnancy could be seen as genocide
when intended to prevent births within a group, particularly within
patriarchal societies.108
101. Id. (citing Todd A. Salzman, Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing:
Religious, Cultural, and Ethical Responses to Rape Victims in the Former Yugoslavia,
20 HUM. RTS. Q. 348, 359 (1998)).
102. See Carpenter, supra note 5, at 223 (explaining the extra harm that victims of
forced pregnancy must endure); Fisher, supra note 15, at 122.
103. Elements, supra note 11, art. 6(d).
104. See Fisher, supra note 15, at 120–21.
105. Markovic, supra note 12, at 453–54.
106. Id. at 453.
107. Carpenter, supra note 5, at 222.
108. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 507 (Sept. 2, 1998).
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Other commentators have noted that the very idea of forced
pregnancy seems to be at odds with genocide.109 Markovic wrote:
When a pregnant woman is held until she gives birth to a “child
of the enemy” and then let go, this would seem to suggest that
the confinement was for the purpose of affecting the ethnic com-
position of her group. The same facts cannot also give rise to geno-
cide unless having the intent to affect the ethnic composition of a
group also means the perpetrator always has the intent to “destroy
in whole or in part.” Such an interpretation, however, would turn
every war crime and crime against humanity of forced pregnancy
into genocide. The framers of the ICC could not have intended
such a result.110
Although forced pregnancy could potentially be prosecuted as geno-
cide, it seems much more likely that it would be prosecuted under
the category of either crimes against humanity or war crimes, which
both specifically list forced pregnancy as a prosecutable crime.111
B. Forced Pregnancy as a Crime Against Humanity
As discussed in Part I, for forced pregnancy to be prosecuted
successfully under the Rome Statute, three elements must be met:
1. The perpetrator confined one or more women forcibly made
pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any
population or carrying out other grave violations of international
law[;] 2. [t]he conduct was committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against a civilian population[; and]
3. [t]he perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended
the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack di-
rected against a civilian population.112
The term “attack directed against any civilian population” is fur-
ther defined as “a course of conduct involving the multiple com-
mission[s] of [the act] against any civilian population, pursuant to
or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such
109. E.g., Markovic, supra note 12, at 454–56; see also R. Charli Carpenter, Surfacing
Children: Limitations of Genocidal Rape Discourse, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 428, 443 (2000)
(noting that for forced pregnancy to qualify as genocide, one must accept the idea that a
child’s identity is based solely on the ethnicity of the father and that the mother’s eth-
nicity is completely disregarded).
110. Markovic, supra note 12, at 455.
111. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 7(1)(g), 8(2)(b) (xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi).
112. Elements, supra note 11, art. 7(1)(g)-4 (emphasis added).
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attack.”113 As is clear from the Elements, the perpetrator must sat-
isfy two different levels of intents: (1) an intent to either affect the
ethnic composition or to carry out other grave violations of inter-
national law, and (2) an intent for the conduct to be part of a wide-
spread attack directed against civilians.114
In regard to the requirement of affecting the ethnic composition,
it will be difficult to prove that the individual perpetrator acted with
the intent of affecting the ethnic composition. It is entirely possible to
argue that the individual was merely following orders or following the
example of other perpetrators who he had seen commit similar
acts.115 Furthermore, it is likely that those individuals who do have
the intent of affecting the ethnic composition, those who are giving the
orders, are not the same individuals who commit the actual conduct.
As such, while those giving the orders might have the mens rea, they
are not committing the acts, and thus, may lack the actus reus as they
are not physically responsible for doing the actual confining of the
woman who is forcibly made pregnant.116 Conversely, those following
orders may lack the mens rea, but could potentially be found to have
committed the act.117 In both cases, the elements are unfulfilled.
113. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(a).
114. Elements, supra note 11, art. 7(1)(g)-4.
115. The Rome Statute does include a provision dealing with “[s]uperior orders and
prescription of law”; it states:
The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been com-
mitted by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior,
whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal respon-
sibility unless: (a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of
the Government or the superior in question; (b) The person did not know
that the order was unlawful; and (c) The order was not manifestly unlawful.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 33(1).
116. See Gerhard Werle, Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute,
5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 953, 968 (2007) (“Nevertheless, the person giving orders cannot be
regarded as a perpetrator of the crime (not even under the concept of perpetration by
means) if he or she does not fulfil [sic] all necessary mental elements him- or herself. Thus,
ordering is particularly relevant to those cases in which the accused held a position in the
mid-level of a hierarchy in which he or she both received and issued orders.”). Note that
those ordering the acts could potentially be found guilty of committing the crime through
the commission of another person or be liable as the person who ordered the crime. Rome
Statute, supra note 1, art. 25(3)(a)–(b). “In accordance with this Statute, a person shall
be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of
the Court if that person: (a) [c]ommits such a crime . . . through another person, re-
gardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible; [or] (b) [o]rders, solicits
or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted . . . .” Id. To
prove this, however, there must be records or some other reliable evidence of the order,
which could prove difficult to produce.
117. But see Arthur Thomas O’Reilly, Command Responsibility: A Call to Realign
Doctrine with Principles, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 71, 93 (2004) (noting that negligence,
which arguably would be the level of intent for those committing forced pregnancy on the
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The second intent requirement, that one is intending “the con-
duct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
a civilian population,” could be equally hard to demonstrate.118 Again,
the difficulties stem from the fact that the people doing the confining
are likely different from those who organize the widespread attack.119
It will be extremely difficult to show that there was a single person
responsible, a person who committed the requisite act with the nec-
essary intent in mind.
Furthermore, the Statute as written would allow for “freelancers”
to engage in the confinement of women and their enforced pregnancy
with no fear of consequences.120 If the goal is truly to protect women,
a man taking advantage of the chaos of a conflict situation, forcibly
impregnating a woman (or multiple women), and making her bear
that child would be no less guilty than the man who commits forced
pregnancy under orders as part of a widespread or systematic attack.
As the elements of forced pregnancy are currently written, the free-
lancer likely has a double defense to forced pregnancy as a crime
against humanity: (1) that he did not know there was a plan to af-
fect the ethnic composition, and (2) that he did not know a wide-
spread or systematic attack was taking place.121 The question must
be asked: is this man’s act of forced pregnancy any less criminal than
the man who is following orders?122
orders of a superior, is probably a “basis for imposing criminal liability”).
118. Elements, supra note 11, art. 7(1)(g)-4. Knowing an act is part of a widespread
attack is enough. Id. It seems likely, however, if one is acting and knows that he is acting
as part of a widespread attack, that he would not also have the intent that his action be
part of the attack.
119. See Werle, supra note 116, at 963–64; see also Markovic, supra note 12, at 450
(asking the question, “how can forced pregnancy be part of this attack unless there is at
least implicit state approval of the crime?” and noting that prosecutors have traditionally
had a difficult time proving that there was a state or organizational policy sanctioning
such acts).
120. Markovic, supra note 12, at 452.
121. But see id. (explaining that, based on precedent in Prosecutor v. Tadic, even those
“tangentially connected” with a conflict—like freelancers—are likely to be considered
“associated with an armed conflict if the criminal act is not unrelated to the armed
conflict and was not done for the perpetrator’s purely personal motives”).
122. There is debate amongst scholars about whether following orders in this sort of
situation makes the perpetrator less culpable than someone acting of their own accord.
Since Nuremberg, the defense of obedience to superior orders has only been permitted
in limited circumstances. See, e.g., Jeanne L. Bakker, Note, The Defense of Obedience to
Superior Orders: The Mens Rea Requirement, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 55, 63–64, 66–67 (1989).
The absolute liability theory “take[s] the extreme position that obedience to superior
orders has no role in the determination of criminal culpability.” Id. at 63. “Under the
‘manifest illegality’ principle, . . . . [o]bedience to superior orders is allowed as a defense
only where orders are not so manifestly illegal that subordinates did not know or could
not have known them to be unlawful.” Id. at 66.
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Finally, the fact that forced pregnancy is often an act that takes
place in isolation causes problems.123 Scholars question whether an
act committed in isolation can even be considered part of an attack.124
Even if such an isolated act theoretically could be considered part of
a widespread attack, it will be difficult to prove in court that an iso-
lated act was, beyond a reasonable doubt, part of a widespread attack
and, furthermore, that the perpetrator intended it to be part of a wide-
spread attack.125
C. Forced Pregnancy as a War Crime
Similar to forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity, the
successful prosecution of forced pregnancy as a war crime requires
that three elements be met:
1. The perpetrator confined one or more women forcibly made
pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any
population or carrying out other grave violations of international
law[;] 2. [t]he conduct took place in the context of and was associ-
ated with an international [or non-international] armed conflict[,
depending upon which section of the Rome Statute is being pros-
ecuted; and] 3. [t]he perpetrator was aware of factual circum-
stances that established the existence of an armed conflict.126
To prosecute forced pregnancy as a war crime successfully, the
prosecutor must overcome one of the same difficult mens rea bar-
riers as discussed with regard to crimes against humanity.127 The
perpetrator must intend to affect the ethnic composition of a popu-
lation or intend to carry out other grave violations.128 To prove this
crime, the prosecutor is faced with the same difficulties of showing
that the perpetrator doing the confining had the actual intent to af-
fect the ethnic composition or to carry out other grave violations of
international law.129 That is, they face the difficulty of proving a par-
ticular mindset and must demonstrate that the perpetrator was not
123. Markovic, supra note 12, at 450 (citing Brook Sari Moshan, Comment, Women,
War, and Words: The Gender Component in the Permanent International Criminal Court’s
Definition of Crimes Against Humanity, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 154, 183 (1998)).
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. Elements, supra note 11, art. 8(2)(b)(xxii)-4 (emphasis added); see also id. art.
8(2)(e)(vi)-4 (enumerating the elements of the war crime of forced pregnancy when oc-
curring during non-international conflict).
127. See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text (discussing the intent difficulties
with the Rome Statute’s forced pregnancy provision).
128. Elements, supra note 11, arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii)-4, 8(2)(e)(vi)-4.
129. See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text (explaining how it will be difficult
to find that a single perpetrator has both the necessary mens rea and actus reus).
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just following orders or the actions of those around him. In other
words, just as for crimes against humanity, it will be hard to show that
the same person had both the actus reus and the mens rea to prose-
cute forced pregnancy successfully as a war crime.130
Unlike forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity, the intent
to affect the ethnic composition or carry out other grave violations of
international law is the only intent the prosecutor must prove for
forced pregnancy as a war crime.131 The perpetrator does not need to
intend that the conduct take place as part of an international or non-
international conflict.132 Rather, the prosecutor must show that the
perpetrator was simply “aware of factual circumstances that estab-
lished the existence of an armed conflict.”133 Additionally, the prose-
cutor must show that an armed conflict of either an international or
non-international scope was taking place.134
Although the testimony of others can serve as proof of an armed
conflict that was commonly known about, it is harder—though not
impossible—to prove that a man intended his actions to be part of a
widespread or systematic attack.135 Prosecuting forced pregnancy as
a war crime would seem to be the easiest on the prosecutors; rather
than having to prove multiple levels of intent, he need only prove the
actus reus of forced pregnancy and one intent element.136 Awareness
of a conflict should be easier to demonstrate in court; particularly in
a situation where there is widespread violence, a prosecutor should
be able to make the case that the perpetrator was aware of the cir-
cumstances, thus fulfilling the elements for forced pregnancy as a
war crime.137
D. Intent Problem with the Definition of Forced Pregnancy
The main intent problem found in both the crimes against hu-
manity and the war crimes provisions against forced pregnancy
stems initially from the definition of forced pregnancy itself.138 The
130. See supra notes 115–19 and accompanying text (noting the difficulties surround-
ing the intent element for forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity).
131. See Elements, supra note 11, arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii)-4, 8(2)(e)(vi)-4.
132. See id.
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. Id.
135. The person could be acting as a freelancer or merely following the actions of people
around him. See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text (explaining the difficulties
in proving that an accused perpetrator intended his acts as part of a widespread or
systematic attack).
136. See Elements, supra note 11, arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii)-4, 8(2)(e)(vi)-4.
137. See id.
138. Again, the definition is “the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made preg-
nant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out
other grave violations of international law.” Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(f).
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requirement that the perpetrator must intend to affect the ethnic
composition of a population or commit a grave violation of interna-
tional law is found there.139 As stated at length above, it will be dif-
ficult to show that perpetrators committing the acts have the intent
of affecting the ethnic composition and those that do have such in-
tent will rarely be the ones actually committing the actions needed
to prosecute forced pregnancy.140
IV. A CRIME TARGETING GENDER OR ETHNICITY?
A. A Language Problem
As previously noted, the Rome Statute was hailed as a signifi-
cant step in the protection of women under international law, and
the prohibition against forced pregnancy was enacted as part of
this initiative. The language in the forced pregnancy provision,141
however, seems less targeted at protecting an individual woman
and more aimed at shielding ethnic groups.
The definition of forced pregnancy is the root of the problem. As
stated above, the term is defined as “the unlawful confinement of a
woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the eth-
nic composition of any population or carrying out other grave vio-
lations of international law.”142 Though it happens to involve the
confinement of an individual woman, the importance is laid on the
intent of affecting the ethnic composition. Even if a woman is forc-
ibly made pregnant, under no circumstances will it qualify as a crim-
inal act under the Rome Statute if there is no intent either to affect
the ethnic composition or to commit a grave violation against inter-
national law.143
For forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity, even if the
prosecutor shows that the perpetrator did confine a victim forcibly
made pregnant, that the perpetrator intended that act to be part of a
widespread or systematic attack, and that there was in fact a wide-
spread or systematic attack, the perpetrator will not be found guilty
if the prosecutor is unable to show this further intent.144 Likewise,
139. Id.
140. See supra notes 115–19 and accompanying text (describing the difficulties of show-
ing that a single individual both has the requisite mens rea and committed the actus reus).
141. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(f).
142. Id.
143. See id.; Elements, supra note 11, arts. 7(1)(g)-4, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-4, 8(2)(e)(vi)-4 (making
it clear that all three elements, including this special intent, are necessary to prosecute the
crime successfully).
144. See Elements, supra note 11, art. 7(1)(g)-4 (listing explicitly that all three of the
elements are needed to prosecute forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity).
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for forced pregnancy as a war crime, the perpetrator will not be found
guilty even if the prosecutor demonstrates that the perpetrator con-
fined a woman forcibly made pregnant, that the act “took place in
the context of or was associated with” either an international or non-
international conflict, and that the perpetrator was aware of said
conflict, unless he also proves the additional intent element.145
The bottom line of the forced pregnancy provisions, then, is this
intent to affect the ethnic composition of a population or carry out
additional violations of international war. The language as it cur-
rently stands establishes forced pregnancy as a crime of an individ-
ual or individuals against a different ethnic group—rather than a
crime against an individual woman. The wrong is clearly focused on
the perpetrator’s intent to have a harmful effect on the victim’s ethnic
group, not on the harm the woman will suffer from the confinement
itself and the result of the confinement—bearing a rapist’s offspring.
B. Comparing Provisions
Comparing the definition of forced pregnancy against the Rome
Statute’s definition of the crime of rape only serves to reinforce this
idea. Like forced pregnancy, rape is listed as an act that qualifies as
both a crime against humanity and a war crime.146 The elements for
rape as a crime against humanity are as follows:
1. The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct re-
sulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of
the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal
or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part
of the body[;] 2. [t]he invasion was committed by force, or by threat
of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress,
detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such
person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive en-
vironment, or the invasion was committed against a person inca-
pable of giving genuine consent[;] 3. [t]he conduct was committed
as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a
civilian population[; and] 4. [t]he perpetrator knew that the con-
duct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread
or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.147
Several things become clear when these elements are compared
against the elements of forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity.
145. Id. arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii)-4, 8(2)(e)(vi)-4.
146. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 7(1)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi).
147. Elements, supra note 11, art. 7(1)(g)-1 (footnotes omitted).
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In both, a woman is forced to take part in sexual activity without
her consent. For the woman in a rape scenario, she is forced to en-
dure “[t]he invasion” of her body by force or threat of force against
herself or another person.148 For the woman in a forced pregnancy sce-
nario, she is forced to engage in intercourse, such that she becomes
pregnant;149 additionally, the victim of forced pregnancy is confined
and forced to carry her pregnancy to term.150 Elements (3) and (4) of
rape are identical to elements (2) and (3) of forced pregnancy.151 For
both, the perpetrator must know or intend the conduct to be part of
a widespread or systematic attack, and it must actually be part of
a widespread or systematic attack.152
Where the two crimes really differ, then, is that to prosecute
forced pregnancy successfully, there must be evidence of an addi-
tional intent that the perpetrator acts “with the intent of affecting
the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave
violations of international law.”153 Rape, on the other hand, seems
to be punishing only the action of violating the bodily integrity of the
woman. Comparatively, then, it seems that the crime of forced preg-
nancy is not a crime of a man violating an individual woman’s body,
but an attack against the ethnic group of which she is a member. It
does nothing to protect the woman who is not targeted as a member
of a particular ethnic group; even a woman who is part of a different
ethnic group than her perpetrator but was not targeted as such would
find herself unprotected by this provision.
In fact, forced pregnancy is the only sexual crime provision with-
in the Rome Statute that requires specific intent. The elements for
148. Id.
149. In many cases, the woman who is a victim of forced pregnancy has been forced
to undergo multiple sexual encounters. See, e.g., Report of the Commission of Experts for
Yugoslavia, supra note 4, ¶ 248 (describing the camps where women were repeatedly
raped until they were impregnated).
150. Elements, supra note 11, art. 7(1)(g)-4. Scholars note that the legal harm is really
just the confinement. See Markovic, supra note 12, at 457. A woman could potentially
be raped and become pregnant by one man, and then be confined so as to keep that preg-
nancy by another. It is only the man who does the confining that can be prosecuted under
the forced pregnancy provision. Id.
151. Elements, supra note 11, arts. 7(1)(g)-1, 7(1)(g)-4.
152. Id.
153. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(f). Markovic suggests that a textual reading
of the definition could mean that the prosecutor will not have to explore the reasons
underlying a rape. Markovic, supra note 12, at 444. However, this seems unlikely given
that the Elements include it. If a prosecutor must show that a woman was forcibly made
pregnant, it stands to reason that he will also have to show the intent behind that
pregnancy—whether it be to affect the ethnic composition or to carry out other grave
violations of international law.
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sexual slavery,154 enforced prostitution,155 enforced sterilization,156 and
sexual violence,157 like the elements for rape,158 lack the additional
layer of intent that forced pregnancy requires—that the perpetrator
acts “with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any popu-
lation or carrying out other grave violations of international law.”159
A specific intent to affect an ethnic group is, however, found with-
in the Rome Statute, but not as a crime against humanity or a war
crime. Rather, it is in the elements for genocide.160 Regardless of which
section of Article 6 genocide is being charged, the prosecutor must
demonstrate that “[t]he perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or
in part, that national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”161 Forced
pregnancy is the only sexual crime that requires this additional level
of intent, making it harder to prove than the other crimes of sexual
violence. One of the ideas behind crimes against humanity and war
crimes is that they can be charged when the prosecutor will not be able
to prove this greater—and much more difficult to prove—additional
level of intent that would elevate a crime to an act of genocide.162
Forced pregnancy, though classified as a crime against humanity or
as a war crime, requires a level of intent greater than those classes of
crimes generally need.
V. REVISING THE STATUTE
Despite the views of some, it matters greatly that there be a
separate crime of forced pregnancy. As the discussions at the Rome
Conference suggested, many consider that the “wrong” involved in
forced pregnancy is the rape alone and suggest that the pregnancy is
merely an “aggravating circumstance.”163 This conceptualization fails
to consider that the harm of forced pregnancy goes far beyond the
154. Elements, supra note 11, arts. 7(1)(g)-2, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-2, 8(2)(e)(vi)-2.
155. Id. arts. 7(1)(g)-3, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-3, 8(2)(e)(vi)-3.
156. Id. arts. 7(1)(g)-5, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-5, 8(2)(e)(vi)-5.
157. Id. arts. 7(1)(g)-6, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-6, 8(2)(e)(vi)-6.
158. Id. arts. 7(1)(g)-1, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1, 8(2)(e)(vi)-1.
159. Id. arts. 7(1)(g)-4, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-4, 8(2)(e)(vi)-4.
160. Elements, supra note 11, art. 6(a)–(e).
161. Id.
162. See William A. Schabas, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and Darfur: The
Commission of Inquiry’s Findings on Genocide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1703, 1716–17 (2006)
(“Crimes against humanity can be used to describe a much broader range of atrocities,
involving violence against the person and persecution, that fall short of physical de-
struction of a group. Moreover, a discriminatory intent or motive is only required for the
crime against humanity of persecution, whereas it informs the whole concept of specific
intent that is an element of the crime of genocide.”).
163. 5th Meeting Summary Records, supra note 80, ¶ 11.
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consequences of the rape. As Robyn Charli Carpenter noted, “Where
forced impregnation is an intentional aim of such rapes it exacer-
bates the impact of rape by making it more visible and explicit, pre-
cluding victims from protecting themselves and their community
through silence or denials, and symbolically branding the victims
with the mark of the rapes.”164
Notably, the victimization of a woman who is forcibly impregnated
lasts long beyond the rape. She must undergo nine months of confine-
ment and bodily turmoil as she watches her body change as a result
of the trauma to which she was subjected. Additionally, the crime of
forced pregnancy includes a constant reminder of the woman’s vic-
timization—the child resulting from the crime—that women who
were raped, but do not become pregnant, do not have.165 The harm is
much greater than that of the woman who is raped; the woman is giv-
en the responsibility of giving birth to and often caring for a child that
is the product of a bodily invasion and is meant to remind the target
community of their victimization.166 Unlike the victim of rape, she
cannot just keep silent and hide her humiliation; the evidence of the
intrusion of her bodily integrity and the sexual violence against her
is on display as her body changes.167 Not to recognize the additional
harm is to minimize the woman’s worth in the eyes of the law.
There are several changes that could be made in the language of
the Statute to solve the difficulties prosecutors will face in successful-
ly bringing a charge of forced pregnancy. The first is to change the def-
inition of forced pregnancy itself by removing “the intent of affecting
the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave
violations of international law.”168 This would leave the definition as
“the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant.”169
Without this extra level of intent, forced pregnancy would be on
an even playing field with the other crimes of sexual violence. For
crimes against humanity, the perpetrator would need to intend to
“confine[ ] one or more women forcibly made pregnant” and either
164. Carpenter, supra note 5, at 223.
165. See id. (explaining that those women who raise the children of their rapists do
so without “the support of their families or communities, who view the children as mem-
bers of the ethnic group who perpetrated the genocide”).
166. Id. at 230. The child that results from the rape and forced pregnancy will face
stigmas from birth; these stigma will likewise attach to the mother. See id. at 223, 230.
“Children of forced maternity are born—and are expected to be born—into a situation
where they will certainly face chronic discrimination. This is the intent of forced ma-
ternity[,] . . . that they symbolize to the target group biological domination and ruin . . . .”
Id. at 230.
167. Id. at 223.
168. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(f).
169. Id.
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know or intend that act to be “part of a widespread or systematic at-
tack directed against a civilian population.”170 Although it could still
be difficult to show that a lower-level soldier/actor intended the con-
duct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack, circumstantial
evidence could be used to show that the perpetrator most likely had
knowledge that the act was part of a widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population.171 It is seemingly much simpler to prove
that someone intended his actions to be part of an attack, even if he
were following orders, than it is to show that the individual had a par-
ticular goal of affecting the ethnic composition of the victimized group.
For forced pregnancy as a war crime, the prosecutor would have
even less to prove. In such cases, the prosecution would have to
show that the perpetrator intended to confine a woman forcibly
made pregnant, and that the perpetrator was aware of the “factual
circumstances” of the armed conflict.172
This does not mean that the ICC should not criminalize the acts
of a perpetrator who does have the greater intent of affecting the
ethnic composition. Rather, where this greater intent is present, the
crime of forced pregnancy should rise to the level of genocide. The
current language in the definition of forced pregnancy in the Rome
Statute as compared to its other crimes of sexual violence, numerous
scholars’ arguments, and the dicta in Akayesu all point to the fact that
forced pregnancy can rise to the level of genocide.173 In situations in
which the prosecutor can prove that the perpetrator had this ad-
ditional intent of affecting the ethnic composition, he should do so.
Where the prosecutor cannot, however, he should be able to charge
the perpetrator with forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity or
a war crime, depending on the circumstances surrounding the crime
and the perpetrator’s level of awareness of those circumstances.
170. Elements, supra note 11, art. 7(1)(g)-4. The prosecutor would, of course, also have
to prove the non-intent element that the conduct was actually committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. Id.
171. See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text (explaining the difficulty in prov-
ing knowledge of a widespread or systematic attack).
172. Elements, supra note 11, arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii)-4, 8(2)(e)(vi)-4. Again, the prosecutor
would have to demonstrate that the confinement actually “took place in the context of
and was associated with” an armed conflict. Id.
173. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(f) (defining forced pregnancy to
include a perpetrator’s intent to affect ethnic composition), Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case
No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 507 (Sept. 2, 1998) (stating that forced pregnancy com-
mitted with the intent to prevent births within a group could be considered genocide),
Boon, supra note 1, passim (arguing that forced pregnancy could be considered a geno-
cidal act), and Fisher, supra note 15, passim (arguing that forced pregnancy is a crime
of genocide), with Elements, supra note 11, art. 7(1)(g)-1–3, 5–6 (listing the elements for
rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, enforced sterilization, and sexual violence,
which do not include a perpetrator’s intent to affect ethnic composition as an element).
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From the victim’s perspective, the crime is likely no less harm-
ful simply because the perpetrator did not intend to affect the com-
position of her ethnic group. As a woman and as an individual, she
has been violated. International law should not punish the victim
by requiring that her perpetrator have this additional mindset. To do
so is to ignore the harm to the woman and to allow the wrongful actor
to go free after committing an act that is no less atrocious for the lack
of additional intent.
CONCLUSION
Forced pregnancy was included in the Rome Statute as part of a
greater initiative to protect women from violence.174 Unfortunately,
the language in the Rome Statute undermines this laudable goal. The
provision for forced pregnancy in the Rome Statute for the ICC will
prove difficult to prosecute due to the high level of intent found in the
Statute’s definition of forced pregnancy and the elements of forced
pregnancy as both a crime against humanity and a war crime. An
additional special intent of “affecting the ethnic composition of any
population or carrying out other grave violations of international law”
is found only in the crime of forced pregnancy,175 distinguishing it from
all the other crimes of sexual violence found in the Statute.176 This
suggests that the crime is, unlike the other crimes of sexual violence
enumerated in the Rome Statute, geared at protecting ethnic groups
rather than women.177 As such, in addition to the difficulties that will
likely arise in prosecuting the crime, the provision actually fails to
do what it was implemented to do—protect women.
The simple change of removing the language “with the intent
of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out
other grave violations of international law”178 from the definition of
forced pregnancy would alleviate the greatest intent problems and al-
low prosecutors to bring the charge with a significantly better chance
of proving their case. Without this added level of intent, prosecutors
would only need to show that the perpetrator intended to commit the
act of confinement to a woman who had been forcibly impregnated
174. See supra Part II (explaining the evolution of crimes of sexual violence under
international law and the events that led to the realization that there was a need for
greater protection for women).
175. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(f).
176. See supra Part IV.B (comparing the Rome Statute’s provisions for rape and forced
pregnancy).
177. See supra Part IV (demonstrating how forced pregnancy fails to protect women,
as its focus is on ethnic groups).
178. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(f).
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with the circumstances necessary to make it a crime against human-
ity or a war crime. Until this change is made, the Rome Statute will
likely protect no one, whether it be ethnic groups or women, because
the level of intent is too difficult to prove.
It would also be sensible to include forced pregnancy under the
genocide provisions of the Rome Statute to be used in those situa-
tions where the prosecutor will be able to show that the perpetrator
did have the additional intent of affecting the ethnic composition of a
population when he committed an act of forced pregnancy. This would
allow the ICC to punish defendants who do hold this greater level
of intent without leaving women unprotected from acts of forced
pregnancy when the defendant lacks the additional intent. Most im-
portantly, the change in language and addition of forced pregnancy
as a genocide where the additional level of intent exists would finally
be a step towards protecting women from such acts of violence, the
primary purported goal of including forced pregnancy in the Rome
Statute. Removal of the “affecting the ethnic composition”179 lan-
guage would transfer the benefits of the provision’s protection from
ethnic groups to women. This would finally provide women in conflict
situations with the protections that the Rome Statute intended when
it initiated its provisions against female-targeted violence.
ALYSON M. DRAKE*
179. Id.
* J.D. Candidate 2012, William & Mary School of Law; M.L.S., Library Science and
Archival Management, University of Maryland, College Park; B.A., History and Philosophy,
magna cum laude, Nazareth College. The author thanks her parents and grandparents for
their support and guidance. She also thanks the staff and Editorial Board of the Journal
of Women and the Law for their hard work and attention to detail.
